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[387] 
BEYOND THE BELLONI DECISION: SOHAPPY V. 




Indian tribes and their members are leading a revived political, 
legal, and social movement to protect the nation’s natural resources. 
In doing so, tribes and their allies employ many effective strategies 
but core to the movement are the historic promises made to tribes by 
the United States through treaties. Tribes are asserting treaty-
protected rights, which the United States Constitution upholds as 
the supreme law of the land, to defend the resources on which they 
and their ancestors have relied for generations. Those claims have 
resulted in significant legal victories, igniting a broader movement 
in favor of tribal sovereignty and securing a prominent and 
perpetual tribal presence in the movement and on the ground. 
Given the strength of this modern movement and the centrality 
of treaty rights to its success, it is hard to believe that, just two 
generations ago, those rights faced seemingly existential threats. 
Notwithstanding bedrock Supreme Court precedent from the first 
half of the 1900s recognizing the supremacy of Indian treaties, tribal 
members exercising the rights those treaties guaranteed were under 
attack in the Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes, with armies of 
state wildlife rangers and law enforcement arresting tribal members 
for not following state laws and regulations. Then, in 1968, the 
Supreme Court cut against its earlier solicitude for tribal treaty 
rights by opening the door for broad state power to establish laws, 
rules, and regulations that could govern tribal members engaged in 
treaty-reserved activities. Facing escalating harassment from state 
authorities, the Court’s endorsement of state priorities seemed to 
leave little room for the meaningful exercise of treaty rights as the 
tribes and tribal members themselves saw fit. 
 
*Associate Professor, Director of the Margery Hunter Brown Indian Law Clinic, and Inter-
im Co-Director of the Clinical Program, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the Uni-
versity of Montana. Thanks to the faculty, staff, and students of Lewis & Clark Law 
School for the invitation to an outstanding symposium celebrating the 50th anniversary of 
the Belloni decision, which took place on October 18th, 2019, and at which this paper was 
presented. Special thanks to Professor Michael C. Blumm for his help with this draft and 
additional appreciation to Hallee Kansman for her research assistance. 
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But, with his 1969 decision in Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Robert 
Belloni began to reverse the course of that time and, in doing so, 
opened the modern era of tribal sovereignty over natural resources. 
Judge Belloni’s approach to reaching that momentous decision 
recognized the permanence and supremacy of tribal treaties while 
also accounting for the ongoing exercise of state sovereignty. Rather 
than approach the balance of those two interests as a zero-sum 
proposition, however, Judge Belloni sought and provided practical 
guidance pursuant to which states and tribes could work together to 
ensure their continued coexistence. While that coexistence would 
demand higher burdens and more limitations on the state’s exercise 
of authority, Judge Belloni also had the foresight to provide a 
judicial forum for resolving conflicts over those burdens and 
limitations and urged the parties to reach cooperative agreements 
beyond the courtroom doors. Judge Belloni’s approach and the 
Sohappy decision laid the foundation for state and federal courts 
struggling to balance state authority and tribal treaty rights. This 
Article traces the legacy of the Sohappy decision across litigation in 
the Great Lakes region, where members of the Chippewa Tribes 
fought to continue their time-honored and treaty-reserved practices, 
various states sought to regulate those activities, and judges relied 
on Judge Belloni’s wisdom and insight to reach sustainable 
solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Entering the second millennium’s third decade, American Indian 
tribes and their members continue the lifeways, cultures, and traditions 
that they and their ancestors have practiced since time immemorial.1 
 
 1 This Article uses the general descriptor “Indian” as the legal term of art widely in-
corporated into federal law, see for example Title 25 of the United States Code, entitled 
“Indians,” but the author recognizes that other descriptors, such as Native American or 
Indigenous, are far more accurate and appropriate. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–4301 (2012). For a rich 
discussion of the interwoven nature of the activities carried out by tribal members and 
spirituality, see David Treuer: Language Carries More Than Words, ON BEING WITH 
KRISTA TIPPET (June 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/3BG9-UZUL. 
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These practices, including activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering, 
are interwoven with the cultures, ceremonies, and spirituality of many 
tribal societies, making their ongoing practice an essential aspect of 
protecting and enhancing tribal existence.2 Unlike prior decades, 
however, tribes and their expanding exercise of sovereignty, are now 
two generations into a meteoric rise from the depths of the termination 
era of the mid-Twentieth Century3 and leading the way to represent 
those values and ensure their survival.4 In doing so, tribes, their allies, 
and their members build upon the legal standing of treaties their 
ancestors made with the United States and the protection those treaties 
offer for the continued exercise of rights reserved therein.5 A recent 
string of important victories demonstrate the permanence and power of 
these arguments, as tribes push the boundaries of historic treaty 
agreements to better serve their modern needs.6 
While those victories have immediate impact,7 the future potential 
of the current moment is even more striking, particularly in light of the 
seemingly dim future that treaty-reserved rights faced just fifty years 
ago. While the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized and upheld the 
supremacy of treaties,8 and even insulated tribal members from some 
state efforts to interfere with their exercise of treaty-reserved rights,9 
those legal victories provided little actual protection for tribal members 
seeking to fish or hunt in exercise of treaty-reserved rights until the late 
1960s and early 1970s. In the Pacific Northwest, for example, the state 
of Washington essentially waged war upon tribal fishermen, enacting 
regulations to prohibit them from fishing, arresting them for violating 
those regulations, and confiscating their boats and fishing gear.10 The 
 
 2 See, e.g., Native American Spirituality, INDIANS.ORG, https://perma.cc/M53E-548N  
(last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
 3 See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 57–86 (2005). 
 4 See, e.g., Anna Brady, Through Bears Ears, Tribes Lead the Way for True Collabora-
tion over Utah’s Public Lands, UNIV. OF UTAH S.J. QUINNEY COLL. OF LAW ENVTL. DISPUTE 
RESOL. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/TH82-HHPK; see Anna V. Smith, The Kla-
math River Now Has the Legal Rights of a Person, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019) 
https://perma.cc/9BES-NK3U. 
 5 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 865 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a 
federal court injunction requiring the state to replace culverts that blocked or impeded 
salmon migration and thereby interfered with the treaty reserved right of tribes to take 
fish). 
 6 See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691–92 (2019) (upholding treaty 
rights of the Crow Tribe to hunt in Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest). 
 7 Within months of the Herrera decision and its repudiation of Ward v. Race Horse, 
163 U.S. 504 (1896), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the off-reservation treaty 
rights of the Eastern Shoshone and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, those Tribes began consid-
ering how best to resume the exercise of those rights. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1697; Savan-
nah Maher, E. Shoshone and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Meet to Discuss Off-Reservation 
Hunting, WYO. PUB. RADIO (July 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/4D6S-BBZC. 
 8 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382–84 (1905). 
 10 See, e.g., CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF 
SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 33, 34, 38–40 (2000); United States v. State of 
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situation in the Great Lakes region was similar.11 Those state-supported 
assaults mixed with the economic interests and racism of non-Indian 
communities created dangerous conditions for tribal members and their 
traditional practices.12 
Even the United States Supreme Court seemed to change course 
from its earlier reverence for treaties, rendering a milquetoast 1968 
decision in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game13 (Puyallup I), 
broadly endorsing Washington’s ability to regulate tribal fishermen. 
Although treaties remained the supreme law of the land,14 Puyallup I 
treated their constitutional status only abstractly and the Court 
appeared uninterested in protecting actual, non-theoretical exercise of 
the rights reserved in those agreements.15 Instead, the first Puyallup 
decision suggested that the nation’s highest Court would blithely defer 
to state interests.16 When matched with the ferocity of state and local 
opposition to the exercise of treaty rights on the ground, the Court’s 
recognition of a legal basis from which state governments could act 
marked a potentially existential threat: if the practice of treaty-
protected activities would be subject to state power—even if only in the 
name of conservation—with few clear limits, the permanence of those 
practices and the tribal role in protecting them would be seriously 
jeopardized.17 
But, despite the setback of Puyallup I and the dangers from state 
police and local non-Indians, tribes and tribal members across the 
country refused to accept the possibility that their time-honored rights 
might be diminished.18 Tribal hunters, fishers, and gatherers continued 
to exercise their rights, and tribes, along with the United States as 
trustee on their behalf, began to consider new legal avenues for 
defending those rights. Richard Sohappy and thirteen of his fellow 
members of the Yakama Nation, insisted on a different future for tribes 
 
Wash., 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the State of Washington’s efforts 
to avoid federal court orders requiring management of the salmon fishery to respect tribal 
treaty rights rivaled efforts of southern states to resist desegregation), vacated, Washing-
ton v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 696 (1979). 
 11 See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fish-
ing of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1991). 
 12 Id.; Gabriel Chrisman, The Fish-in Protests at Franks Landing, THE SEATTLE CIVIL 
RTS. & LAB. HIST. PROJECT, https://perma.cc/68JM-D5CT (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
 13 391 U.S. 392, 399 (1968) (“The overriding police power of the State, expressed in 
nondiscriminatory measures for conserving fish resources, is preserved.”). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 15 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 400 (suggesting tribal rights are subject to the same regula-
tions as all other fishing by non-tribal members). 
 16 Id. at 398. 
 17 Id. at 398–99 (“[T]he manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of com-
mercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, 
provided the regulation meets the appropriate standards and does not discriminate 
against the Indians.”). 
 18 See WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 166–72. 
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and treaty rights and were integral in lighting the fuse of that 
movement.19 
In 1968, Sohappy and his fellow plaintiffs, who eventually joined 
the United States and the tribes of the lower Columbia,20 filed a demand 
for a federal court decree to define their treaty-reserved fishing rights in 
Oregon.21 By doing so, the Sohappy v. Smith plaintiffs opened the door 
to the modern era of tribal treaty rights, an era ushered in and defined 
by Judge Belloni’s 1969 decision in Sohappy. Rather than adopting the 
Supreme Court’s unworkable and zero sum Puyallup I concepts, Judge 
Belloni approached Sohappy’s demand from a practical perspective, 
acknowledging the well-established legal basis for treaty rights while 
sketching a path forward demanding recognition of and equality for 
their continuing—and perpetual—exercise.22 In rendering the Sohappy 
decision, Judge Belloni recognized the importance of a broader view of 
the interests at stake and demanded that the state decision-making also 
expand beyond its own, narrower concerns.23 Finally and perhaps most 
critically, Judge Belloni understood that neither the tribes nor the 
states would disappear and, by retaining continuing jurisdiction and 
calling on the defendant states to work cooperatively with the tribes, his 
Sohappy decision created a new framework to support the ongoing 
development of practical solutions.24 That framework eliminated the 
existential threats posed by Puyallup I and, instead, shifted the focus to 
specific details of how treaty rights would be exercised: how many fish 
would be caught, by what means, at which locations, and subject to 
oversight by whom. After Sohappy, the tribes could begin answering 
those questions on an equal footing with states and do so with eyes 
toward their own needs, values, and perspectives. Judge Belloni’s 
Sohappy decision thereby announced the modern era of tribal treaty 
rights and natural resources management by ensuring tribes could 
continue to meaningfully exercise their rights according to their own 
sovereign priorities. Thanks to that decision and the five decades of 
subsequent decisions and hard work that built upon it, that modern era 
 
 19 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 903–04 (D. Or. 1969). 
 20 Id. at 904 (stating the United States filed a separate suit against the State of Oregon 
“on its own behalf and on behalf of the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yak[a]ma 
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Umatilla Reservation . . . , the Nez 
Perce Indian Tribe, and ‘all other tribes similarly situated,’” in which the Warm Springs 
Tribe, the Yakama Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe intervened and which was ultimately 
consolidated with the Sohappy case). 
 21 Id. at 903–04. 
 22 Id. at 911 (“In the case of regulations affecting Indian treaty fishing rights the pro-
tection of the treaty right to take fish at the Indians’ usual and accustomed places must be 
an objective of the state’s regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs for 
other users.”). 
 23 Id. at 910 (“In considering the problem of salmon and steelhead conservation in the 
Columbia River and its tributaries, it is necessary to consider the entire Columbia River 
system.”). 
 24 Id. at 911–12. 
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is now defined by the efforts and successes of Indian tribes and their 
members to expand and protect their historic, treaty-reserved rights. 
Sohappy came at a critical turning point in the development of 
treaty rights jurisprudence and by virtue of his approach and analysis 
in that decision, Judge Belloni connected the historical legal status of 
treaties to the realities of their everyday exercise in the current day. 
This Article marks the 50th anniversary of Judge Belloni’s decision in 
Sohappy by detailing the importance of those connections and tracing 
Judge Belloni’s influence across treaty rights litigation in the Great 
Lakes. The scope of that influence and the ongoing usefulness and 
importance of Sohappy’s framework demonstrates that, just as the 
Supreme Court’s blanket endorsement of tribal sovereignty in the 1959 
decision of Williams v. Lee25 marked the beginning of the modern era of 
federal Indian law,26 Sohappy changed the course of history by 
providing a firm platform from which tribes could exercise that 
sovereignty to sustain their treaty reserved rights. 
To support that argument, the Article begins with a brief review of 
that historical legal status and the challenges presented by state efforts 
to interfere with treaty rights, particularly in the mid-1900s. From 
there, the Article details the novel approach utilized in Sohappy and 
traces how that framework played out for the tribes of the Great Lakes. 
While a series of judicial decisions in that region resulted in slightly 
different approaches to the balance of state regulatory power and tribal 
treaty rights, the concepts and perspectives announced by Judge Belloni 
in Sohappy were instrumental in setting the stage for those approaches. 
Despite the consistency across these decisions, however, the Article 
concludes with a cautionary note stemming from recent Supreme Court 
opinions that appear to pose a potential return to the unexamined 
approach utilized by the Puyallup I court. Despite that potential, the 
wisdom and power of Sohappy remain critically important for tribes and 
their allies seeking to protect and expand their traditional treaty-
reserved rights and are likely to remain important in treaty right 
challenges to come. 
II. TREATIES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISES MEANT TO ENDURE (BUT STILL 
SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION) 
Treaties made by and between the United States and Indian tribes 
have defined the terms of that relationship from the founding of the 
federal government. Beyond that relationship, however, tribal treaties 
have also helped inform basic principles inherent in the nature of our 
constitutional republic. The Supreme Court’s resolution of the important 
questions posed by tribal treaties and the rights reserved therein helped 
set the stage for the modern era of tribal treaty rights ushered in by 
Sohappy. 
 
 25   358 U.S. 217 (1959).  
 26 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 1 (1987). 
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Upon its founding, the United States acceded to a long tradition of 
“linking arms together” with Indian nations by continuing to engage 
with those nations through treaties.27 By the time the Constitution was 
ratified, tribes were negotiating and entering treaties with European 
colonial powers for over 175 years.28 The practice of reaching terms on a 
government-to-government basis to serve the mutual interests of both 
sovereigns was already well-accepted and represented an important and 
ongoing bond rooted in ceremony, especially from the tribal 
perspective.29 
Given that long history, the critical national interests served by 
treaty arrangements with native people, and the penchant for colonists 
and their local interests to interfere with those commitments, it is not 
surprising that the ratified Constitution included a provision ensuring 
that the treaties made or yet to be made by the United States would be 
the supreme law of the land.30 But, although the Supremacy Clause 
establishes the primacy of treaties as a legal matter,31 it was not until 
Chief Justice John Marshall began interpreting and applying that 
clause in the context of treaties between the United States and the 
Cherokee Nation that the true weight of Indian treaties became clear.32 
The language of those solemn agreements helped define and invigorate 
the constitutional federalism of the republic and establish the balance of 
power—tipped entirely in favor of the federal government—with regard 
to engaging in relations with Indian tribes.33 In reviewing the terms of 
these agreements, Marshall made clear their import, not just to the 
Cherokee Nation, who was seeking the protection of the United States 
from the existential threats posed by Georgia, but also their role in the 
early legislative identity and action of the United States.34 Those 
important national purposes helped support Marshall’s conclusion that 
the federal government and, importantly, his own Supreme Court, could 
review and negate Georgia’s laws as “repugnant to the constitution, 
laws, and treaties of the United States.”35 From its earliest days, 
 
 27 See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800 at 121–23, 128–29 (1997). 
 28 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 97 
(7th ed. 2017) (“The first-ever formal treaty ceremony recorded between English colonists 
and an Indian confederacy in North American occurred in 1608 at Powhatan’s seat of gov-
ernment . . . .”). 
 29 See WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 103. 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 536, 549–57 (1832) (reviewing treaty 
provisions to conclude that “[t]he treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the 
Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all inter-
course with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”). 
 33 See id. at 557. 
 34 Id. at 556–57 (“From the commencement of our government, congress has passed 
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, re-
spect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties 
stipulate.”). 
 35 Id. at 562. 
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therefore, the United States depended on treaties with Indian nations 
not only to serve its own national interests but also to engage and define 
the terms of its own internal relations under the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the central role that Indian treaties played in 
elucidating the details of the federal balance of power between the 
federal government and the several states, conflicts between those 
sovereigns over the scope and bounds of tribal relations continued. Less 
than sixty years after Chief Justice Marshall’s resounding endorsement 
of tribal treaties as instruments of federal protection insulated from 
state interference, the Court famously noted the ongoing tension 
between states and tribal nations, saying in United States v. Kagama36 
that “[b]ecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where 
[tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.” As a result, despite 
expressions of federal interest and the supremacy of treaties under 
federal law,37 conflict with states and local citizens persisted. The 
Supreme Court was continually called upon to resolve these conflicts, 
especially with regard to the exercise by tribal members of reserved 
treaty rights. 
The first of these significant decisions arose within twenty years of 
the Court’s Kagama decision and began the Court’s long tradition of 
resolving conflicts over the rights of tribes in the Pacific Northwest to 
exercise their treaty reserved rights to take fish in their usual and 
accustomed locations.38 Over the first half of the twentieth century, 
these decisions laid an important legal foundation for the continuing 
exercise of those rights by confirming their nature, scope, and existence. 
In United States v. Winans, for example, the Court rejected the 
argument that rights reserved by the Yakama Nation in an 1855 treaty 
with the United States were abrogated by the admission of the State of 
Washington to the Union.39 Central to the Court’s interpretation and 
protection of the reserved right was its recognition that the treaty 
“seemed to promise . . . and give the word of the Nation for more” than 
just allowing Indians to exercise the same rights as other citizens of the 
state.40 The Court recognized that the right to take fish at traditional 
fishing locations was “part of larger rights possessed by the Indians,” 
and that the “form of the [treaty] and its language was adapted” to 
preserve the exercise of those rights, albeit “in common with the citizens 
of the territory.”41 The Winans Court understood the importance of those 
rights to the Yakama, calling them “not much less necessary to the 
 
 36 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
 37 Id.; U.S. CONST. art VI, para 2. 
 38 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 371 (1905) (decided approximately twenty 
years after Kagama was decided in 1886). 
 39 Id. at 382–84. 
 40 Id. at 380; see also Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary 
than the Atmosphere They Breathed:” Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A 
Centennial Remembrance of United States v. Winans and its Enduring Significance, 46 
NAT. RES. J. 489, 491 (2006). 
 41 Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. 
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existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed,”42 and laid 
a critical foundation for their continuing vitality even in the depths of 
the dismal allotment and assimilation era.43 
But, while upholding the continuing existence of rights guaranteed 
through the treaty with the United States, Winans did not wrestle with 
the nuances of Washington’s ability to control the exercise of those 
rights and, if so, to what extent. Instead, the Winans Court dismissed 
the state’s concern over the rights as a limitation on state sovereignty by 
suggesting that the Treaty does not “restrain the State unreasonably, if 
at all, in the regulation of the right.”44 The Court again picked up that 
thread in deciding Tulee v. State of Washington45 in 1942, in which 
another member of the Yakama Nation challenged Washington’s 
attempts to force him to acquire a state fishing license in order to 
exercise his treaty-reserved fishing rights. Washington asserted that its 
“broad powers to conserve game and fish within its borders” authorized 
state licensing authority over Mr. Tulee and similarly situated tribal 
fishermen.46 While the Court rejected that specific requirement, saying 
that it could not be “reconciled with a fair construction of the treaty,” 
the Court, relying in part on its earlier statement in Winans, did 
recognize a right of the state to “impose on Indians, equally with others, 
such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and 
manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the 
conservation of fish.”47 
With the encouragement of these words from the Supreme Court, 
Washington continued its efforts to regulate tribal fishing in the 
interests of conservation and, through state regulations, began 
prohibiting precisely the manner of fishing in which members of the 
Puyallup and Nisqually Tribes engaged: the setting of nets at the 
mouths of rivers where salmon would migrate.48 By the time the 
Supreme Court considered tribal challenges to these regulations in its 
1968 Puyallup I decision, then, it was clear that Washington’s efforts to 
regulate in the interests of conservation could completely frustrate, if 
not prohibit, the exercise of treaty-reserved rights in contravention of 
the Court’s long history of protecting the sanctity of those treaties from 
state interference and the very foundations of federal Indian law.49 As 
the Court’s negative treatment of other uniquely tribal rights has 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 The Court subsequently relied on Winans to recognize that the treaty reserved to 
the Yakama rights to fish on both sides of the Columbia River in Seufert Bros. Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919). 
 44 Winans, 198 U.S. at 384; see also Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 40, at 535–36. 
 45 315 U.S. 681, 682 (1942). 
 46 Id. at 683. 
 47 Id. at 684–85 (citations omitted). 
 48 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1968). 
 49 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. 515, 552–57 (1832). 
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demonstrated,50 facially neutral laws or regulations that serve other 
state interests such as conservation tend to have narrow, direct, and 
disparate impact on Indian tribes and their members. But, with Winans’ 
one-sentence recognition of the possibility of state regulatory authority 
over the exercise of treaty rights, bolstered by Tulee’s expansion of that 
concept, the Court strode boldly forward, determining that “the manner 
of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and 
the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, 
provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not 
discriminate against the Indians.”51 The Court did determine that the 
state’s regulation measures must be “reasonable and necessary” in the 
interests of conservation but, given the lack of clarity around those 
standards, refused to decide whether the prohibition on tribal net 
fishing met those requirements.52 
By the summer of 1968, therefore, the status and continuing 
viability of treaty-reserved rights to fish, particularly in the Pacific 
Northwest, remained unsettled. Despite the Supreme Court’s tradition 
of solicitude for the import of the promises made by the United States,53 
the increasing pressure of conflicting state interests and attempts to 
control tribal member fishing on the same basis as all other citizens of 
the state convinced the Court to open the door to unprecedented state 
power to limit or even prevent the exercise of the rights reserved in 
those promises.54 A century and a half after Chief Justice Marshall 
relied on tribal treaties to establish the unique and exclusive federal-
tribal relationship and invalidate state attempts to interfere therein, 
Puyallup I provided a broad and nebulous basis for precisely such state 
interference.55 Meanwhile, tribal members continued to fish in reliance 
on the supremacy of their treaty-reserved rights.56 Two such members of 
the Yakama Nation, Richard and David Sohappy, were arrested for 
doing so in the summer of 1968 and, along with a dozen of their fellow 
tribal members, asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 
to resolve the interplay of these seemingly conflicted legal 
interpretations.57 
 
 50 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (upholding the constitution-
ality of “neutrally, generally applicable laws” even where such laws interfered with the 
individual religious beliefs of practitioners of the Native American Church). 
 51 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398. 
 52 Id. at 401–02. 
 53 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549–57; Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382, 384 (1905). 
 54 See, e.g., Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 683–84 (1942); Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398. 
 55 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398–400. 
 56 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 57 Michael C. Blumm & Cari Baermann, The Belloni Decision and its Legacy: United 
States v. Oregon and its Far-Reaching Effects After a Half-Century, 50 ENVTL. L. 347, 360–
63 (2020) (discussing Puyallup I). 
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III. TURNING THE TIDE: THE SOHAPPY DECISION 
Like its neighbor to the north, Oregon engaged in numerous efforts 
to regulate and control the exercise of tribal treaty rights. In a statute 
dating back to 1901, for example, Oregon had closed a portion of the 
Columbia River to fishing by any means other than angling, thereby 
putting tribal members who used traditional fishing methods such as 
nets at risk of arrest by state officers.58 Similarly, the state’s game and 
fish commissions exercised “broad authority to regulate the times, 
places and manner of taking fish” as well as the rules regarding 
possession of fish, oftentimes upon the presumption that all fishermen, 
whether tribal or not, must be treated equally.59 While the Sohappy 
plaintiffs, which included tribal members, various tribes, and the United 
States,60 did not dispute that the state, pursuant to Puyallup I, had 
some authority to regulate “the manner of fishing, the size of the take, 
the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by 
the State in the interest of conservation,”61 they contended that such 
power was much more limited than the manner in which Oregon had 
been exercising it.62 Thus, the Sohappy plaintiffs sought a decree that 
would define the nature of their treaty reserved rights, cabin state 
authority to interfere with those rights, and result in a workable 
outcome that might avoid the arrests and harassment that continued 
through the late 1960s and early 1970s.63 
Oregon urged Judge Belloni to reject that attempt and, instead, 
insisted that the relevant treaty language guaranteed to the tribes only 
those rights equally available to all other state citizens.64 Based on that 
interpretation, the state viewed its regulation of tribal fishermen on the 
same basis as its statewide efforts to promote conservation of dwindling 
salmon and steelhead populations as well as the state’s own sport and 
commercial fishing industries.65 In other words, Oregon argued that its 
regulatory power was applied equally across all those accessing and 
utilizing the fishery resource and that the treaties required nothing 
more, particularly in light of the treaty language suggesting that tribal 
rights would be exercised “in common with the citizens” of the 
 
 58 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Or. 1969). 
 59 Id. at 906–08. 
 60 Id. at 903–04. 
 61 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). 
 62 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 906–07. 
 63 Id. at 903–04, 907 (urging Judge Belloni to require that the 1) state preliminarily 
establish a reasonable and necessary conservation purpose before seeking to regulate trea-
ty fishing; 2) state’s regulatory agencies treat tribal fishing differently from non-Indian 
fishing; and 3) state regulations allow treaty fishermen to take “a fair and equitable share” 
of the fish). 
 64 Id. at 904–05. 
 65 See id. at 910–11 (“Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commercial fishermen 
and seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two.”). 
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territory.66 In the state’s view, its regulatory authority was supreme and 
available to serve state interests, regardless of tribal rights.67 
Judge Belloni quickly and with memorable flourish dismissed the 
state’s position, suggesting that it would be tenable only “if all history, 
anthropology, biology, prior case law and the intention of the parties to 
the treaty were to be ignored.”68 But Judge Belloni’s decision in Sohappy 
went well beyond his colorful rejection of Oregon’s equal access/equal 
application arguments. Through his thoughtful and prescient approach 
acknowledging both the supremacy of the tribes’ treaty rights and the 
challenges posed by the murky avenues for state regulation authorized 
in Winans, Tulee, and Puyallup I, Judge Belloni developed three key 
concepts that continue to define judicial approaches to the balance of 
state authority and the exercise of tribal treaty rights. First, the 
Sohappy decision rejected a zero-sum approach and accepted the 
permanence of both state sovereignty and treaty rights; a perspective 
that forced the development of practical and perpetual accommodations 
for balancing these competing principles and avoided an all-or-nothing 
result. Second, Judge Belloni developed such a workable approach 
through his deeper understanding of the nature of state regulations and 
his avoidance of the broad and largely conceptual directions from earlier 
Supreme Court decisions. Finally, in conjunction with each of those 
foregoing perspectives, Judge Belloni recognized the need for continuing 
and dynamic solutions that would adapt to the changing needs of the 
states, tribes, and resources without demanding an overly formalistic or 
rigid answer. 
A. The Permanence of States and Tribes 
While looking back from the current era of prominent tribal 
sovereignty may provide a different perspective, just fifty years ago, 
tribes, treaties, and tribal governments within the United States still 
faced an uncertain future. Though most tribes had survived the federal 
government’s termination era, over one-hundred tribes were in fact 
terminated, with devastating and long-lasting impacts on their status 
and members.69 And, although tribal leaders had begun to sway federal 
policies closer to tribal priorities in both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, it was not until 1970 that President Nixon’s statement 
to Congress formally rejected the termination policy and endorsed a new 
 
 66 See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakama Tribe, Yakama Tribe-U.S., art. III, June 9, 1855, 
12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Indians in Middle Oregon, Indians in Middle Oregon-U.S., 
art. I, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Walla-Walla, Walla-Walla Tribe-
Umatilla Tribe-U.S., art. I, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Nez Perces, Nez 
Perce Indians-U.S., art. III, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957. 
 67 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp at 907. 
 68 Id. at 905. 
 69 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151–54 (1977). 
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era of tribal self-determination.70 Thus, while momentum was swinging 
toward the continued and expanding exercise of tribal sovereignty, the 
staying power of that swing was by no means assured when Sohappy 
was decided. 
That uncertain future reflected a long history of federal policies 
premised on the demise or disappearance of tribes and any associated 
treaty rights. Since the earliest days of the republic, the nation’s 
founding fathers indicated a preference for removing tribes from conflict 
with non-Indian settlers under the presumption that, over time, tribal 
lands, people, and identities would be absorbed and subsumed within 
the broader American experience.71 Those beliefs were incorporated into 
early federal policies and, in many ways, motivated the federal 
government’s treaty negotiation strategy and overall relationship with 
tribes.72 
During the assimilation and allotment era of the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, federal policy was expressly premised on eliminating tribes 
and tribal cultures, with the entire might of the burgeoning American 
empire aimed directly at dispossessing Indian lands, destroying cultural 
connections, and severing tribal traditions and family ties.73 While 
considering the Winans case in 1905 at the height of that assault, the 
Supreme Court may have had a much different view on the future 
vitality of the rights that they were upholding.74 Perhaps that Court’s 
passing acknowledgment of state regulatory authority was in 
recognition of widespread view of the time that tribal members would 
ultimately be treated on the same basis as all other state citizens. Aside 
from that possibility, the long history of federal policies premised on the 
disappearance of tribes and their treaties would certainly provide a 
basis for upholding broader state authority over tribal members. 
But Judge Belloni rejected that history and, instead, emphasized 
both the constitutional supremacy and true nature of the treaties at 
issue in Sohappy.75 The decision describes that the agreements are “not 
 
 70 See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, The Forgotten American, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
438, 440 (Mar. 6, 1968) (“I propose, in short, a policy of maximum choice for the American 
Indian: a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-determination.”); 
RICHARD NIXON, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 3 
(1970); 116 CONG. REC. SEN. 23,258 (1970) (“Federal termination errs in one direction, 
Federal paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting both of these extremes can 
we achieve a policy which truly serves the best interests of the Indian people. Self-
determination among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of 
eventual termination.”). 
 71 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington, Commander-in-Chief, to James Duane, 
Head of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Continental Congress, (Sept. 7, 1783), re-
printed in GETCHES ET AL., supra note 28, at 99–100. 
 72 See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 28, at 101. 
 73 Id. at 194–99. 
 74 Even artistic renditions of Native people during this era, such as James Earle Fra-
zer’s (in)famous “end of the trail” sculpture, suggested their impending demise. See, e.g., 
Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner’s Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas, 39 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 486 (1991). 
 75 See Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 905 (1969). 
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treaties of conquest but [instead] were negotiated at arm’s length,” and 
notes that, by 1969, all of the parties to the treaties agreed as to their 
meaning.76 Judge Belloni went on to restate the essential canon of 
treaty interpretation, that treaty language is to be read as the tribes 
would have understood it and that the rights reserved in the treaties 
were essential to the tribes—their consent to the terms of the 
negotiation would not have been secured without the promises 
regarding fishing.77 Though the Supreme Court had approached its 
Puyallup I decision in a similar “spirit,”78 the majority quickly turned to 
dissecting the treaty language without regard for any tribal 
understanding of it or mention of the importance of those rights to the 
tribes.79 
By beginning his analysis from a faithful application of the 
foundations of federal Indian and tribal treaty jurisprudence, Judge 
Belloni dispelled any notion that the state could ultimately eliminate or 
even substantially diminish the constitutionally supreme and inherently 
integral treaty rights that he was being urged to protect. Instead, with 
those principles as his starting point, successfully resolving Sohappy 
would demand a new solution that could accommodate both the status of 
those rights and the potential regulatory authority of the state 
recognized through passing statements in Winans and Tulee and 
wholeheartedly endorsed by Puyallup I.80 
B. Practical Solutions 
Importantly, rather than just rely on the broad and conceptual 
statements of those Supreme Court decisions, Judge Belloni sought to 
provide more practical and workable guidance to the Sohappy parties. 
To begin that process, Judge Belloni distilled the rather ambiguous 
language of Puyallup I into three more concrete guidelines: “First, the 
regulation must be ‘necessary for the conservation of the fish.’ Second, 
the state restrictions on Indian treaty fishing must ‘not discriminate 
against the Indians.’ And third, they must meet ‘appropriate 
standards.’”81 Analyzing Oregon’s existing statutory and regulatory 
measures against this rubric, Judge Belloni determined that the state’s 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 905–06. 
 78 Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). 
 79 See id. (“But the manner in which the fishing may be done and its purpose, whether 
or not commercial, are not mentioned in the Treaty. We would have quite a different case 
if the Treaty had preserved the right to fish at the ‘usual and accustomed places’ in the 
‘usual and accustomed’ manner. But the Treaty is silent as to the mode or modes of fishing 
that are guaranteed. Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclu-
sive one. Rather, it is one ‘in common with all citizens of the Territory.’ Certainly the right 
of the latter may be regulated. And we see no reason why the right of the Indians may not 
also be regulated by an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State.”). 
 80 Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905); Tulee, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Puyallup I, 391 
U.S. at 398. 
 81 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 907. 
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efforts met none of those guidelines, holding instead that state 
standards were too broad to be necessary for conservation purposes,82 
discriminated against the Indians by virtue of a complete lack of 
consideration of their treaty rights,83 and failed to meet appropriate 
standards for protecting those rights.84 Instead of leaving the decision 
there, however, Judge Belloni presented additional guidance to help the 
parties progress toward a more appropriate balancing of state interests 
and tribal rights. 
With regard to the availability of state regulations in the interests 
of conservation, for example, Judge Belloni instructed that, although the 
state retains broad authority over non-Indians to serve its regulatory 
objectives, “it does not have the same latitude” over tribal rights.85 
Rather, “[t]he state may not qualify th[at] federal right by subordinating 
it to some other state objective or policy.”86 The state must instead 
demonstrate both the need to limit the take of fish and the necessity of 
the particular regulation upon the exercise of the treaty right before 
pursuing such regulations.87 Beyond its own regulatory objectives, 
therefore, the “treaty right to take fish . . . must [also] be an objective of 
the state’s regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs 
for other users.”88 
In addition, Judge Belloni directed that the state consider the 
entire Columbia River system in the context of determining its 
regulatory approach and “must manage the over-all fish run in a way 
that does not discriminate against the treaty Indians as it has 
heretofore been doing.”89 That determination would ensure that the 
tribal members, with “an absolute right to th[e] fishery” get the “fair 
share of fish produced by the Columbia River system” to which their 
treaties entitle them.90 
Finally, with regard to the development of new state rules and 
regulations, Judge Belloni insisted that the tribes be duly informed of 
and represented in the state’s decision making process.91 Although 
Sohappy did not result in a requirement that the state secure tribal 
consent for its management of the fishery resource, Judge Belloni 
 
 82 Id. at 908. 
 83 Id. at 910. 
 84 Id. at 911. 
 85 Id. at 908. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 908–09. 
 88 Id. at 911. 
 89 Id. at 910. 
 90 Id. at 911. 
 91 Id. at 912 (“The state must recognize that the federal right which the Indians have 
is distinct from the fishing rights of others over which the state has a broader latitude of 
regulatory control and that the tribal entities are interested parties to any regulation af-
fecting the treaty fishing right. They, as well as their members to whom the regulations 
will be directly applicable, are entitled to be heard on the subject and, consistent with the 
need for dealing with emergency or changing situations on short notice, to be given appro-
priate notice and opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rule-making process.”). 
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foresaw and demanded recognition by the state of the unique tribal 
perspective on those issues.92 
With these determinations, Judge Belloni set the stage for a more 
effective and responsive state regulatory structure that better aligned 
with the foundational role of treaties and treaty rights in the American 
legal system. Instead of simply dealing with these complex issues on 
that conceptual basis, however, Judge Belloni gave clear and practical 
instructions to the parties that would help guide them toward a more 
appropriate and functional future relationship.93 In further recognition 
of the challenges presented by effectuating those instructions, Judge 
Belloni also set forth avenues for resolving further disagreements. 
C. Resources for Future Disputes 
By taking a more holistic and practical approach than his 
predecessors who faced these conflicts, Judge Belloni understood the 
need for a dynamic and adaptable solution that could continue to evolve 
with the changing environment and needs of the parties. The Sohappy 
decision recognized that the reality of attempting to regulate a largely 
anadromous fishery necessarily meant that conditions on the ground 
would change as greater or fewer fish traversed the Columbia River 
system.94 He also realized that requiring an equitable share for tribal 
fishermen and mandating state consideration of tribal treaty rights as a 
co-equal regulatory objective would place new and previously 
unconsidered demands on the state, which would likely result in 
additional but unpredictable challenges and conflicts.95 Therefore, in a 
prescient stroke that would continue to pay dividends for the parties to 
the case, Judge Belloni retained continuing jurisdiction over the case, a 
status that continues to the present day.96 That status has proven to 
fulfill Judge Belloni’s prediction that ongoing judicial oversight would 
“be the only way of assuring the parties an opportunity for timely and 
effective judicial review of [regulatory] restrictions should such review 
become necessary.”97 
In an effort to potentially avoid the need for such additional review, 
Judge Belloni suggested that the parties work together to accommodate 
their interests on a cooperative basis.98 Although he noted that tribal 
consent to state regulations was not required, he stressed that 
“agreements with the tribes or deference to tribal preference or 
regulation on specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of treaty fishing 
 
 92 See id. 
 93 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 94 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Id. Although the court’s jurisdiction continues, recent decisions have administrative-
ly closed the matter for reasons unknown to the parties. See Blumm & Baermann, supra 
note 57, at 370–71, 381. 
 97 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911; see also Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 380. 
 98 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912. 
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rights are means which the state may adopt in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction,” and he encouraged the state and the tribes to do so.99 
Perhaps more than any other of Sohappy’s important holdings, this 
encouragement reflected the potential and desire for a new and more 
progressive era of state–tribal relations regarding the exercise of treaty 
rights. Far from the “deadliest enemies” conception of the late 1800s,100 
and more effective than relying on the Supreme Court to sketch only 
conceptual boundaries for that relationship, Judge Belloni’s call for a 
(state)government–to–(tribal)government–to–(federal)government 
cooperative approach brought together his due regard for tribal treaties 
and sovereignty, his guidance to the parties to reach practical solutions, 
and his hope that the future would bring progress toward those ends. As 
subsequent litigation over treaty rights in the Great Lakes region 
demonstrates, other courts would soon follow Judge Belloni’s lead to 
resolving these challenges.101 
IV. SOHAPPY FEELING ‘SUMMER IN THE SPRING’102 
On September 28th, 1971, A.B. LeBlanc, a member of the Bay Mills 
Indian Community, took his boat about 300 yards out into Lake 
Superior and set his nets to catch some fish.103 LeBlanc was soon 
confronted by state natural resources officials who informed him that he 
was illegally fishing in waters closed to commercial fishing according to 
Michigan’s 1929 Commercial Fishing Act and offered to provide LeBlanc 
with a copy of that state law.104 LeBlanc responded that he had a copy of 
the 1836 treaty between the United States and the Chippewa and 
Ottawa Indians that he would also be happy to provide to the state 
officials.105 
Although LeBlanc’s arrest and citation for illegally fishing under 
Michigan law was not the first such legal challenge regarding Chippewa 
treaty rights in the Great Lakes,106 it marked the first time that courts 
of the Great Lakes region began to wrestle with the complexity of the 
supremacy of Indian treaties and state attempts to regulate the exercise 
of those rights.107 The Sohappy framework announced by Judge Belloni 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
 101 See United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 102 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 375. 
 103 Michigan Indians in Fishing Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1971), 
https://perma.cc/W7VZ-DDD9. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. For consistency with historic treaties and to avoid confusion, this Article uses the 
term Chippewa in lieu of Ojibwe or Anishinaabe. 
 106 See, e.g., People v. Chosa, 233 N.W. 205 (Mich. 1930) (upholding state convictions of 
tribal treaty hunters), overruled by People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d 375 (Mich. 1971). 
 107 In Jondreau, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on the supremacy of treaties and 
State v. Arthur, 261 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1953), in denying any state regulatory power over the 
exercise of tribal treaty rights, and suggested that if conservation issues became a concern, 
the terms of the 1854 treaty at issue, which allowed for the President of the United States 
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would play a critical role in how those courts ultimately addressed those 
challenges. 
Like the tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the various bands of the 
Chippewa entered into a series of treaties with the United States, 
pursuant to which the bands ceded wide swaths of territory across the 
entire Great Lakes region.108 Though negotiating in an earlier era and a 
different context, the Chippewa, like the tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 
insisted on treaty language that would leave in place their time-honored 
lifeways across the waters and lands of their territory.109 While 
subsequent decades would subject them to immense pressure, loss of 
land, assimilation, and the onslaught of state authority,110 the bands of 
the Chippewa and their members across the upper Midwest would 
maintain and eventually assert those treaty-reserved rights as a means 
to protect their own traditions and enhance their individual and 
collective sovereignty. 
In considering the state’s attempt to prosecute Mr. LeBlanc, the 
Michigan Supreme Court began by applying the time-honored canons of 
treaty construction to interpret the treaty language at issue there. 
Based on those principles, the court determined that the 1836 Treaty 
reserved the right for the Chippewa to fish in the Great Lakes even 
though fishing was not expressly mentioned by the treaty’s language.111 
Even with that interpretation, however, Michigan still insisted that its 
laws applied to Mr. LeBlanc; a proposition that the court noted, “has 
been the subject of a good deal of controversy.”112 Like Judge Belloni in 
Sohappy, the Michigan Supreme Court considered the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s consideration of state authority in Tulee and Puyallup I but, 
ultimately, looked for additional guidance from subsequent decisions, 
like the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Antoine v. Washington,113 to 
“help[ ] clarify” that precedent.114 Ultimately, however, the Michigan 
 
to “issue an order limiting or extinguishing the hunting and fishing rights of the Indians,” 
could provide a remedy. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d at 380–81. 
 108 See, e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa, Chippewa of Michigan-U.S., art. I, May 9, 1836, 
7 Stat. 503; Treaty with the Chippewa at St. Peter’s, Chippewa Nation of Indians-U.S., 
art. I, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; Treaty with the Chippewa at La Pointe Of Lake Superior, 
Chippewa of Lake Superior and Mississippi-U.S., art I, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. 591; Treaty 
with the Chippewa, Chippewa of Lake Superior and Mississippi-U.S., art I, Sept. 30, 1854, 
10 Stat. 1109; see also Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 383–85 (describing the treaty negotia-
tions and the sophistication with which the Chippewa approached them). 
 109 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 387–88; see, e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa at St. 
Peter’s, supra note 108, at art. V (“The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the 
wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guar-
antied [sic] to the Indians, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.”). 
 110 Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 389–93. 
 111 People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199, 204–05 (Mich. 1976). 
 112 Id. at 212. 
 113  Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (Puyallup I’s “‘appropriate stand-
ards’ requirement means that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reason-
able and necessary conservation measure . . . and that its application to the Indians is 
necessary in the interest of conservation.’”) (citations omitted). 
 114 LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d at 214. 
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Supreme Court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit’s 1975 decision in United States v. Washington,115 which it 
called “significant in . . . help[ing] define when a state regulation is 
necessary and when such regulation is discriminatory,” and cited 
Sohappy as “another case taking the approach used in United States v. 
Washington.”116 From that guidance, then, the court determined that 
Michigan’s prohibition on gill nets could be applicable to Mr. LeBlanc 
and his fellow tribal members if and only if: 1) that prohibition “is 
necessary for the preservation of the fish protected by the regulation; 2) 
[its] application . . . to the Chippewas is necessary for the preservation 
of the fish protected; 3) and the regulation does not discriminate against 
the Chippewas.”117 
By adopting that basic framework, the Michigan Supreme Court 
provided a foundation for future decisions to flesh out the complicated 
relationship between Chippewa treaty rights and state regulatory 
efforts. Just five years after People v. LeBlanc, for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s reasoning wholesale, saying that LeBlanc “accurately 
states the rule of reason and the principles of federal law applicable” to 
the balance of state authority and tribal treaty rights.118 The Sixth 
Circuit went on to say that, when applying LeBlanc’s three factors and 
considering whether state regulation is necessary, the burden is on the 
state “to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is highly 
probable that irreparable harm will occur and that the need for 
regulation exists.”119 
Like Mr. LeBlanc and the legal challenges brought by tribes and 
the United States in Michigan, the Chippewa of Wisconsin also began 
asserting their treaty rights more forcefully in the early 1970s.120 In a 
1972 decision regarding Wisconsin’s attempt to prosecute tribal 
members for exercising treaty-reserved fishing rights, for example, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, like the Michigan Supreme Court, upheld 
the continuing vitality of those rights but remanded for further 
consideration of whether state regulations might be “reasonable and 
necessary to prevent a substantial depletion of the fish supply” and 
whether such regulations might also be “necessary in the exercise of 
other valid police powers.”121 Thereafter, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band 
 
 115   520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 116 LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d at 215. The court apparently did not recognize that Sohappy 
preceded the Ninth Circuit’s decision by six years, making it the foundational decision of 
its preferred approach. 
 117 Id. at 215. 
 118 United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 119 Id. 
 120 As Wilkinson notes, while improved access to lawyers through legal services pro-
grams was key to this broader movement, it began with tribal leaders across the country 
reaching “a consensus that the terrible descent since the treaties and allotment must be 
halted and reversed.” Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 396–97. 
 121 State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d 892, 902 (Wis. 1972). 
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of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (LCO) brought a declaratory 
judgement action against various Wisconsin officials to confirm the 
existence and status of their treaty rights across the state, a case that 
was consolidated with actions by the United States to protect various 
property interests of the Chippewa established pursuant to their 
treaties.122 Like the Sohappy litigation, this action began a decades-long 
journey through the federal courts of Wisconsin, and, to resolve the 
balance of state authority and tribal treaty rights across the state, those 
courts would come to rely on Judge Belloni’s approach. 
The early decisions in the LCO treaty rights saga focused on treaty 
interpretation and whether subsequent treaties or other federal actions 
invalidated or otherwise affected the rights guaranteed by the 1837 and 
1842 agreements. In the first of these decisions, for example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the canons of treaty 
interpretation,123 analyzed the terms of the treaties,124 acknowledged 
the similar approaches of the Michigan Supreme Court in LeBlanc and 
the Sixth Circuit,125 and concluded that the LCO’s treaty reserved rights 
remained effective, at least upon portions of their ceded lands that were 
not privately owned.126 The case was then remanded “for further 
consideration as to the permissible scope of state regulation over the 
LCO’s exercise of their usufructuary rights.”127 Though the matter’s 
next trip to the appellate court focused on other issues, the court still 
took the opportunity to make clear that the extent of state authority 
would need careful analysis going forward.128 
Following that direction, the district court issued a preliminary 
decision adopting the conservation basis for state regulation but called 
for more detailed briefing and a second phase of the litigation 
specifically focused on the question of state authority.129 After receiving 
briefing on the proper legal standards for considering state regulatory 
authority, the district court issued a sweeping and detailed opinion 
outlining the standards it would apply.130 Though differing in a key 
 
 122 See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1321–22 (W.D. Wis. 1978), rev’d 
LCO v. Voigt (LCO I), 700 F.2d 341, 365 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 123 LCO I, 700 F.2d at 350–51. 
 124 Id. at 354–57. 
 125 Id. at 357. 
 126 Id. at 365. 
 127 Id. 
 128 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO II), 760 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e make it clear on 
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lieved of licensing requirements and no doubt from other restrictions, nevertheless we 
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the district court.”) (citations omitted). 
 129 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO III), 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1435 (W.D. Wis. 1987). 
 130 LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO IV), 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (W.D. Wis. 1987). 
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respect, the district court’s conclusions largely adopted Sohappy and 
Judge Belloni’s treatment of similar questions in that litigation.131 
Relying on Sohappy, for example, the court made clear that Wisconsin’s 
authority to regulate in the interest of conservation must be based on 
specific facts showing such regulation is essential to protect the species 
of concern.132 Similarly, drawing on a subsequent decision regarding the 
plans called for by Judge Belloni,133 the court required that state 
regulations be “the least restrictive alternative available,” which “would 
accord with the tribes’ understanding at the time of the treaties.”134 
But the court refused to limit state regulation to solely conservation 
purposes, saying that the treaty rights at issue in the Great Lakes 
region are different from those in the Northwest and, “extend to dozens 
or even hundreds of resources.”135 Therefore, the court allowed that the 
state could regulate tribal treaty rights “only in certain narrowly 
defined circumstances” such as where such regulations might be 
“necessary to prevent or ameliorate a substantial risk to the public 
health or safety.”136 Even then, however, just as Judge Belloni said in 
Sohappy, treaty rights “may not be subordinated to every state objective 
or policy.”137 
Finally, the court allowed that tribal regulations may preclude 
state regulations, provided the tribal efforts at self-regulation “address 
legitimate state concerns in the areas of conservation of resources and 
public health and safety,” along with acceptable procedures regarding 
enforcement and cooperation with the state.138 Like Judge Belloni’s view 
of a more cooperative future, the court indicated it could help ensure 
that the state and tribe work together, including through the potential 
ordering of “a joint tribal-state natural resources commission.”139 
Thus, with the exception of the possibility of state regulation in the 
interests of public safety, the district court’s comprehensive analysis 
and consideration of these issues largely tracked the Sohappy 
framework.140 Like that decision, LCO IV envisioned the permanence of 
state interests and tribal treaty rights but developed practical and 
considered guidance for their long-term coexistence; guidance that 
substantially limited the state’s regulatory power. Also, just as Judge 
Belloni encouraged intergovernmental cooperation among Oregon and 
the tribes of the Columbia River, the district court used the LCO IV 
decision to prompt deeper consideration of joint state-tribal 
collaboration through a more formally ordered natural resources 
 
 131 See id. at 1235–36. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410, 1412–13 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 134 LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1236. 
 135 Id. at 1238. 
 136 Id. at 1238–39. 
 137 Id. at 1238 (citing Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (1969)). 
 138 Id. at 1242. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. 
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commission. Finally, just as Judge Belloni retained jurisdiction to 
continue to review and address issues arising after Sohappy, the 
Western District of Wisconsin continued to hear challenges related to 
the LCO litigation. 
Just like developments in the district of Oregon after Sohappy, the 
Wisconsin federal court’s approach led to significant and timely progress 
by the state and tribes. Just two years after LCO IV, the court took up 
the specific issue of fishing regulations applicable to the take of walleye 
and muskellunge and described the results of that progress, specifically 
highlighting the benefit of state–tribal agreements.141 The court then 
went on to largely uphold tribal efforts to regulate their own members in 
the take of those fish species, provided the tribal regulations were 
sufficiently detailed to accommodate for biological conditions that would 
ensure conservation.142 
Like the conflicts in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Chippewa in 
present-day Minnesota also sought to assert and protect their treaty 
 
 141 Chief Judge Barbara Crabb was quite complimentary of both parties: 
[w]hat the parties in this case have done to give practical effect to plaintiffs’ judi-
cially recognized treaty rights is a remarkable story. 
. . . . 
It is to this state’s credit that its officials did not adopt the recalcitrant attitude of 
the State of Washington, but chose instead to work to adjust the state’s resource 
management programs to accommodate the newly-recognized rights of the tribes. 
The effort has not been an easy one. The court orders provided no real guidance for 
translating a treaty right into a harvest opportunity. . . . 
The department has negotiated a number of interim agreements with the tribes 
covering the harvesting not only of walleye and muskellunge, but other species of 
fish, deer, small game, migratory birds, bear, and wild rice. . . . 
It is to the tribes’ credit that they have adopted an equally cooperative attitude to-
ward the implementation of their rights. It has not been an easy time for them, ei-
ther. The tribes and their members have been subjected to physical and verbal 
abuse over the recognition of their treaty rights, most publicly when they have at-
tempted to exercise their treaty rights to spearfish, but not only then. Harassment 
has become a fact of life for them. 
Tribal members have negotiated and entered into a series of interim agreements 
with the state that have circumscribed their rights to accommodate state concerns, 
despite their understandable impatience to reap the benefits of treaty rights they 
have been forced to forgo for so many years. 
. . . . 
Both the tribes and the officials of the State of Wisconsin responsible for imple-
menting the tribes’ treaty rights can take pride in their accomplishments over the 
last six years. They deserve widespread recognition and appreciation for their ef-
forts.  
LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO VI), 707 F. Supp. 1034, 1052–54 (W.D. Wis. 1989). 
Though specific to the parties’ work in Wisconsin, the cooperative development of man-
agement plans in the Pacific Northwest is entitled to similar praise. See Blumm & Baer-
mann, supra note 57, at 376–79. 
 142 Id. at 1060. 
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rights there. The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa and various tribal 
members filed suit in 1990 to secure those rights and were eventually 
joined in that effort by the United States and additional tribes with 
treaty rights applicable in that state.143 With the benefit of relying on 
precedent generated by the prior approaches of their fellow tribal 
members in Michigan and Wisconsin,144 the Mille Lacs’ case provided a 
forum for the plaintiff tribes and the defendant state agencies to work 
together on agreeable standards and protocols for the oversight and 
regulation of tribal member hunting and fishing.145 Like in Wisconsin, 
the parties’ “commendabl[e]”146 efforts to cooperatively resolve those 
challenges came up short in some respects, leaving federal court to 
prescribe the boundaries of state authority.147 Once again, the Sohappy 
framework proved appropriate and, despite Minnesota’s attempt to 
reinterpret that case to support an argument for unilateral state 
authority over harvest levels,148 that court ultimately determined that 
state had not met its burden to demonstrate that any regulation of 
tribal treaty rights was necessary for conservation purposes, 
particularly in light of the sufficiency of the code, management plan, 
and supporting materials developed by the Bands and applicable to the 
exercise of those rights by their members.149 
While conflicts over the details and boundaries of the exercise of 
tribal treaty rights would continue, including increasing conflicts over 
the allocation of scarce resources, the framework built upon Sohappy 
and laid down in these cases provided a solid basis from which the court 
could resolve those questions.150 Like Judge Belloni, and guided by his 
thoughtful perspective, the state and federal judges considering these 
complicated questions in the Great Lakes region contemplated the 
ongoing relationship between tribal and state interests and, rather than 
accepting the historical misconception that the tribal presence would be 
temporary, developed workable guidance for accommodating both. While 
the legitimacy of state regulation of treaty rights is arguably 
inconsistent with the clear import of the Constitution’s supremacy 
 
 143 Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 952 F. Supp. 1362, 1365–66 (D. 
Minn. 1997). 
 144 See id. at 1374–75. 
 145 See id. at 1366–67. 
 146 Id. at 1372. 
 147 See id. at 1368–69 (describing “unresolved” issues including the state’s assertion of 
unilateral authority to determine harvestable surplus levels and that those determina-
tions are not judicially reviewable and whether state prohibitions on night hunting and 
gillnetting in certain lakes were necessary for conservation). 
 148 Id. at 1373. 
 149 Id. at 1374–75 (harvestable surplus issue); id. at 1382 (hunting); id. at 1384 (gillnet-
ting); id. at 1385 (all regulatory issues). 
 150 See, e.g., LCO v. Wisconsin (LCO VII), 740 F. Supp. 1400, 1421–22 (W.D. Wis. 1990) 
(“Therefore, I conclude as I have throughout this phase of the litigation that the state may 
regulate for the purposes of conservation or for public safety, but only if it meets its burden 
of demonstrating the need for the particular proposed regulatory measure.”) (emphasis 
added); LCO v. Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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clause and Chief Justice Marshall’s emphasis on treaties as the basis for 
an exclusive federal–tribal relationship,151 Sohappy’s model ensured 
that such state authority would be limited and appropriate only where 
the state could meet a high burden to demonstrate its necessity. Those 
limitations would leave substantial room for tribes to assume the 
primary responsibility for exercising their sovereign prerogatives over 
their members’ treaty-reserved activities. With that model’s recognition 
of tribal permanence, workable guidance, and additional resources for 
further collaboration or dispute resolution, tribes have rapidly built 
some of the leading natural resource and wildlife management systems 
in the nation and continue to build upon their sovereign capacities and 
capabilities.152 
Despite the success of those efforts and the power of the current 
tribal sovereignty movement they are engendering, recent decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, though upholding the sanctity of treaty 
reserved rights, may portend a reassessment of Judge Belloni’s 
approach. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEXT 50 YEARS OF SOHAPPY 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take a detailed dive into the 
balance of state regulatory authority and tribal treaty rights. Though 
the Court heard two sequels to Puyallup I, neither of those opinions 
went much beyond their predecessor’s adoption of the basic conservation 
necessity framework.153 In Puyallup II, for example, though the Court 
called on states to demonstrate some scientific basis for their regulatory 
interests, the majority provided scant guidance on what would 
constitute state discrimination against tribal treaty fishers and three 
concurring justices saw need for further limits on treaty rights.154 And 
that general approach was endorsed again when the Court considered 
 
 151 Cf. LCO VII, 740 F. Supp. at 1421 (“I appreciate the strength of the argument … 
that any state regulation of such rights violates the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution. I appreciate also that the basis for state regulation has never been explained 
satisfactorily. However, the legitimacy of state regulation in this area is not open to recon-
sideration.”) (citations omitted). 
 152 See, e.g., Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC), 
https://perma.cc/VB84-8CFV (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission, https://perma.cc/C6PV-7V6K (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
 153 See, e.g., Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1973) 
(holding that Washington’s prohibition of net fishing constituted discrimination against 
tribal members but that the tribal treaty rights do not “persist down to the very last steel-
head in the river.”); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165, 175 
(1977) (“Our construction of the Treaty of Medicine Creek in Puyallup I makes it perfectly 
clear that although the State may not deny the Indians their right to fish ‘at all usual and 
accustomed’ places, the treaty right is to be exercised ‘in common with all citizens of the 
Territory.’ We squarely held that ‘the right to fish at those respective places is not an ex-
clusive one.’ Rather, the exercise of that right was subject to reasonable regulation by the 
State pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural resource.”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 154 Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48–50 (White, J., concurring). 
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the status of Chippewa treaty rights in Minnesota, an appeal that arose 
from the Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians155 case 
described above. There, the Court relied upon its prior adoption of the 
“conservation necessity standard” to underscore the reconcilability of 
state sovereignty and treaty rights and defeat Minnesota’s claims that 
the Chippewa’s treaty rights were extinguished upon statehood.156 But, 
while the Court has relied on the standard as a general proposition, two 
recent treaty rights decisions indicate that the specifics of state 
authority and the exercise of treaty reserved rights may still trouble the 
justices. 
In 2019’s Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, 
Inc.,157 for example, the Court again considered the Yakama’s 1855 
treaty, this time with regard to its reservation of a right to travel for 
tribal members. Washington sought to assess a tax upon the transport 
of fuel by a tribal member owned company which, in its defense, 
asserted that the state tax would directly burden those reserved 
rights.158 While a plurality of the Court agreed with the tribal member 
company and interpreted the treaty to prohibit the state tax, both 
opinions reaching that conclusion expressly acknowledged the potential 
for state regulatory authority over various aspects of the treaty-reserved 
rights.159 And yet, short of ensuring that state regulations were 
“nondiscriminatory” and did not interfere with the substance of the 
treaty right itself, the plurality appeared to indicate acceptance of the 
potential for state regulations in the interest of public safety but mostly 
glossed over the specific limits on such state regulations; a treatment for 
which the Chief Justice, in dissent, took both opinions to task.160 The 
 
 155 526 U.S. 172, 205 (1999) (“We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose 
reasonable and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights in the interest of conservation. This ‘conservation necessity’ standard ac-
commodates both the State’s interest in management of its natural resources and the 
Chippewa’s federally guaranteed treaty rights.”) (citations omitted). 
 156 Id. 
 157 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1004 (2019). 
 158 Id. at 1004. 
 159 See id. at 1015 (“Although we hold that the treaty protects the right to travel on the 
public highway with goods, we do not say or imply that the treaty grants protection to car-
ry any and all goods. Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives the State of the power to 
regulate, say, when necessary for conservation. . . . Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives 
the State of the power to regulate to prevent danger to health or safety occasioned by a 
tribe member’s exercise of treaty rights. The record of the treaty negotiations may not 
support the contention that the Yakamas expected to use the roads entirely unconstrained 
by laws related to health or safety.”); id. at 1020–21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that Washington may regulate the transportation of hazardous goods, like “bad apples . . . 
just as the State may require tribal members to abide nondiscriminatory regulations gov-
erning the safe transportation of flammable cargo as they drive their gas trucks from Ore-
gon to the reservation along public highways.”). 
 160 Id. at 1024–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Application of state safety regulations, 
for example, could prevent Indians from hunting and fishing in their traditional or pre-
ferred manner, or in particular ‘usual and accustomed places.’ I fear that, by creating the 
need for this untested exception, the unwarranted expansion of the Yakamas’ right to 
travel may undermine rights that the Yakamas and other tribes really did reserve.”). 
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Chief Justice’s concerns suggest a willingness to carefully examine 
potential state interference with the exercise of reserved rights, even in 
the context of conservation necessity.161 If genuine, that willingness may 
signal another ally for tribes seeking to insulate their treaty-reserved 
rights from state regulations; however, the Chief Justice would also 
consider arguments in favor of broader state authority.162  
In the Court’s other significant treaty rights decision of 2019, 
Herrera v. Wyoming,163 the Court upheld the treaty reserved rights of 
the Crow Tribe but the majority “note[d] two ways in which [that] 
decision is limited,” including that “[o]n remand, the State may press its 
arguments as to why the application of state conservation regulations to 
Crow Tribe members exercising the 1868 Treaty right is necessary for 
conservation.”164 The Court did not consider those arguments in 
reaching its decision.165 Despite leaving those arguments for another 
day, the Court did address Wyoming’s concerns that recognizing the 
Crow’s treaty rights would, in Wyoming’s view, undermine the state’s 
previously “unquestioned” regulatory authority over wildlife.166 
Wyoming argued that, since the Court’s 1896 decision in Ward v. Race 
Horse,167 the state believed that treaty rights did not apply within its 
boundaries and that modern recognition of Crow treaty rights would 
disrupt “the settled expectations of private property owners.”168 Though 
the Herrera majority dismissed those concerns as unfounded,169 the 
passing reference to the Court’s increasing reliance on City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of New York170 and the possibility that a future 
Court might be convinced by similar state concerns poses another 
potential complexity for tribes addressing state arguments regarding 
their regulatory authority over the exercise of treaty rights. 
Ultimately, while both Cougar Den and Herrera reaffirmed the 
commitment of a slim majority of Supreme Court justices to the 
 
 161  See id. at 1025 (“…the conservation exception would presumably protect regulations 
that preserve the subject of the Yakamas’ right by maintaining safe and orderly travel on 
the highways.”) (Emphasis added). 
 162   Id. (“Perhaps there are good reasons to revisit our long-held understanding of re-
served treaty rights … and adopt a broad health and safety exception to deal with the in-
evitable fallout.”) 
 163 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019). 
 164 Id. at 1703. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 1698 n.3. 
 167 163 U.S. 504, 516 (1896). 
 168 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1698 n.3. 
 169 Id. (“The State suggests that public support for its conservation efforts may be jeop-
ardized if it no longer has ‘unquestioned’ authority over wildlife management in the Big-
horn Mountains. Wyoming does not explain why its authority to regulate Indians exercis-
ing their treaty rights when necessary for conservation is not sufficient to preserve that 
public support. The State’s passing reference to upsetting the settled expectations of pri-
vate property owners is unconvincing because the 1868 Treaty right applies only to ‘unoc-
cupied lands of the United States.’”) (citations omitted). 
 170 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
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foundational tenets of treaty rights precedent,171 and confirmed the 
power and role of treaty rights in the modern era,172 the Court’s loose 
treatment of the possibility of state regulatory authority suggests the 
potential for future Supreme Court battles over the specifics of those 
issues. Unlike the tenuous nature of tribal treaty rights after Puyallup 
I, however, the last 50 years of progress since Sohappy have charted a 
different and more stable path forward. The uncertain and conclusory 
nature of a decision rendered in a particular case by justices far 
removed from any on-the-ground implications stands in stark contrast 
to the collaborative, practical, and ongoing approach engendered by 
Judge Belloni.173 Following that approach, tribes and states in the 
Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes have worked together for decades to 
build better solutions and—perhaps more importantly—stronger 
interagency and intergovernmental relationships.174 As a result, the 
principles recognized by Judge Belloni in Sohappy—the permanence of 
tribal treaties and state sovereignty and commitments to providing 
clear, workable guidance and long-term solutions—have helped ensure 
that the balance of tribal treaties and state authority remains mostly 
functional across the country, subject to some ongoing skirmishes over 
particularly difficult specifics.175  
Beyond those continuing benefits of Judge Belloni’s framework, 
tribes took advantage of the opportunities it presented to develop their 
sovereign and technical capabilities, efforts that have sparked the 
current era of tribal leadership in a variety of environmental and 
natural resource arenas. The future will almost certainlty present 
additional litigation over the scope of state authority and tribal treaty 
rights. But, regardless of how those specific conflicts are resolved, the 
Sohappy decision has provided a broader foundation from which tribes 
 
 171 The concluding paragraph of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence will likely—and right-
ly—be prominently featured in every future treaty rights case. See Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 
1000, 1021 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Really, this case just tells an old and familiar 
story. The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the 
United States under significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of 
modest promises. The State is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those 
promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the Court 
holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.”). 
 172 Remarkably, the Supreme Court decision in Cougar Den affirmed the decision of the 
Washington Supreme Court, which had also upheld the Yakama’s treaty rights and reject-
ed the state’s attempts to tax Cougar Den. See Cougar Den v. State Dep’t of Licensing, 392 
P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017). Perhaps even more surprising than the United States Supreme 
Court, the state supreme court decision demonstrates the tectonic shift in tribal rights 
over the last century, particularly when compared to the views of the Washington Su-
preme Court in State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805, 807 (Wash. 1916). See Blumm & Baer-
mann, supra note 57, at 385 n. 266. 
 173  See supra notes 69–101 and accompanying text.  
 174   See, e.g., supra note 141; Blumm & Baermann, supra note 57, at 386 n. 272. 
 175 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 865 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a 
federal court injunction requiring the state to replace culverts that blocked or impeded 
salmon migration and thereby interfered with the treaty reserved right of tribes to take 
fish), aff’d by an equally divided Court per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (mem.). 
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and their members can more effectively work with their state and 
federal partners and continue to lead the way forward. 
 
 
